THE CONDUCT OF THE EARL of LOUDON

Impartially reviewed.

The Rt. Hon.ble the Earl of Loudoun

Capt.n General & Governour in Chief of his Majesty's Forces in North America;

and one of the Sixteen Peers of Scotland.

THE CONDUCT OF A NOBLE COMMANDER IN *AMERICA*,

Impartially reviewed;

WITH

The genuine Causes of the Discontents at NEW-YORK and HALIFAX,

AND

The true Occasion of the Delays in that important Expedition;

INCLUDING

A regular Account of all the Proceedings and Incidents in the Order of Time wherein they happened.

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THE

CONDUCT

OF THE

EARL of LOUDON.

A Writer, not very long ſince, dropped ſome ambiguous words, which might be ſuppoſed to reflect upon lord Loudon; and the whole people were alarmed: it was an inſult upon the wiſeſt meaſures; and an abuſe of one of the firſt of men. Power in a little time changed hands; and the public voice changed with it: fluctuating and weak as water; and driven, like that, any way, with the leaſt breath of artful men. Nothing was now expected, where all before ſeemed certain of ſucceſs; and wagers were offered by thoſe who affected to be in the ſecrets of government, that the reſt of the world might form the deſigned opinions.

The meaſures were ſtill the ſame; and the man the ſame who was to conduct them: and if he had not deſerved the firſt extravagant applauſe, far leſs did he merit the new obloquy. The deſign was as likely to ſucceed under one adminiſtration as another; for the force to execute it was unaltered; and neither the old nor new

miniſtry had any ſhare in its contrivance. The plan was his alone who ſtood entruſted with the execution of it; and there neither was nor is any cauſe to doubt, but he would have purſued the true path to its ſucceſs.

He is now returned: and in the place of that glory which he would probably have gained; he has the unfair repreſentations of intereſted men to combat; and hears his conduct arraigned by thoſe who have as little knowledge of the circumſtances, as of the nature of the ſervice.

This his lordſhip has paſſed hitherto, and I ſuppoſe will continue to paſs over, unregarded. The good and great are above the notice of popular clamour: but what themſelves deſpiſe, others often feel for them. I think the earl of Loudon would be as much above anſwering ſuch accuſations, as deſerving them: but they are ſo eaſily refuted, that it were much to be regretted if none ſhould do it.

The general opinion of theſe perſons is, (at leaſt it is their general exclamation) that his lordſhip did not ſufficiently puſh the ſervice; and that Louisbourg might have been taken with the force under his command. They are bold enough to urge the meaſures of government in changing the command, as a circumſtance of proof for their aſſertion.

It little becomes ſuch perſons to judge of the reſolutions of a miniſtry, which it is impoſſible they ſhould underſtand: and it would be as improper for me to queſtion their impropriety, who am as far

far from any knowledge of their motives: but it will be easy to shew, this nobleman deserved no censure; and it must then be indifferent from whom it comes.

If it shall appear by the following fair detail of circumstances, that the earl of Loudon laid a plan of operations, equally for the glory and interest of his country; that this design received the sanction of the government; and himself, its author, had the honour of the command: that the measures by which he pursued this purpose were conformable to reason, and the nature of the service; and that they were approved by those most immediately concerned; that the expedition was pushed with all possible vigour by his lordship; and was rendered impracticable by accidents in which he had no concern; we have reason to hope the candid and honest will continue to pay that regard to his lordship's great qualities, with which they received the notice of his being appointed to command in that enterprize.

This we shall attempt to shew, by a plain recital of facts; which will be related, we hope, with accuracy; at least with impartiality: for we have no view but truth. This has been hitherto obscured by artifices, or defaced by rancour, but it is not difficult to clear off those stains, and present the fair relation to the world. It has not yet been done; and indeed, according to the circumstances, could not easily; for we have depended in England upon the representations of things from

thoſe on the ſpot, who, tho' they knew the truth, were partial.

The people of New York hated lord Loudon for two things; his quartering the troops upon them, and the embargo on their ſhips: and power changed hands in England. The enterprize miſcarried, as half the enterprizes in the world have done, from the circumſtances of things, not from any fault in the commanders: and tho' we ſuffer, no one is to blame. This is the general ſtate of the caſe; and this will appear by the following facts.

We ſhall take in the whole time from the firſt plan of the enterprize, to the return of the troops: and we have neither deſire nor power to miſrepreſent them. They have been laid before the publick as they occurred, and occaſionally, in large recitals: and we may apply to every account that has been publiſhed from the articles of news-papers, to the ſyſtems of the temporary politicians, that they are as here repreſented, and that they never have been repreſented otherwiſe. Theſe being allowed, the reaſonings cannot be contradicted, for they flow from no other ſource; and we flatter ourſelves the impartial publick (to whoſe judgment kings appeal) will entertain no doubt in any circumſtance. What is here offerred is the plain and uninfluenced voice of reaſon: if his lordſhip had been conſulted, doubtleſs it would have been better; but it is thus diſintereſted; and I believe no one will have ſo much cauſe as himſelf to be diſſatisfied.

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The ſtory will ſtand as an example of the vanity of the

Arbitrium popularis auræ.

And if the reader wiſhes to ſee another, let him remember the poor good old lord Blakeney. The vehemence of applauſe, and the ſudden and unmerited turn from it to cenſure or neglect, are miſerable inſtances of the unſteadineſs of the human mind; and while they teach us caution, they ſhould be alſo leſſons of humility.

Toward the latter end of the year before laſt, the earl of Loudon laid before the miniſtry his ſenſe of the ſtate of the war. The importance of North America needed not to be inſiſted on; it was too obvious for argument: the little ſucceſs of our forces there, he ſhewed, was owing to their having undertaken little; and it was propoſed to attempt Cape Breton, and thence all Canada. The enterprize was great, and it was therefore fit for Britons. The thought was worthy of a hero; and with the Propoſition this nobleman laid down the means and meaſures for its execution: vaſt as it appeared, he ſhewed it was practicable; and we have no reaſon to doubt but that he would have proved it ſo in the execution. Perhaps we ſhall ſtill ſee it done with the ſame forces, and upon the ſame plan: and I think I may venture to ſay, that in this caſe no man will be more rejoiced at his country's ſucceſs than lord Loudon, or more indifferent whether it were brought about by himſelf or by another.

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When this nobleman propoſed to the government an enterprize againſt theſe places, he delivered in an account of the force which might be required for its execution; and the greateſt perſons in the kingdom, after a mature conſideration, did equal honour to his lordſhip's head and heart, by approving not the purpoſe only, but the plan of operations; and by committing to his care the conduct of the expedition. Lord Loudon received the approbation of his ſcheme with the ſame coolneſs wherewith he had laid it; and, with an undiſturbed mind, planned the neceſſary meaſures, not of ſucceſs alone in the enterprize, but of ſafety in the colonies which might be expoſed by it.

Three points demanded great conſideration. The preventing the enemy from receiving intelligence of his deſigns; the providing an uninterrupted tranſportation for the troops; and the ſecuring the frontiers of the ſeveral colonies, moſt expoſed to be attacked by the enemy, while the main force was acting effectually on the great ſcheme.

Theſe are the requiſites to a rational undertaking of ſuch importance, and without theſe ſucceſs would either be impoſſible, or the conſequences worſe than its failure.

For theſe lord Loudon provided by a timely care, and by ſuch meaſures as appeared to him left moſt eaſy and effectual.

Had things at home continued in the ſtate wherein he left them, theſe meaſures would have been

been applauded, as they certainly appear to have deserved; and every one of them would have been a new article in his praiſe: but men judged differently by the time the accounts arrived: and the mob, who had before applauded not without reaſon, though without knowledge, were now taught to cenſure and condemn equally without either; and they who knew a little againſt both.

Men who were at this vaſt diſtance were to judge of operations, without knowing upon what circumſtances he who was on the ſpot found them neceſſary; and they who were ignorant of the nature of command, were to determine concerning the meaſures of the war. The politician of a coffee-houſe was to ſit in judgment upon his deſigns, whom the government had underſtood to be perfectly capable of the ſervice; and it may be ſaid, with that freedom which becomes the truth, ignorance was not his moſt dangerous enemy. Men were taught to ſay what thoſe who influenced them knew to be falſe; and the reputation of the commander was to be ſacrificed, while he was purſuing a deſign approved by his country, by thoſe very meaſures which he had laid down for its execution.

I ſhall not anticipate, by entering into particulars, what may be neceſſary on a more important occaſion; but I ſhall add, there are ſome who will bluſh to read this; and perhaps fear what may follow.

As to the popular opinion, no man deſpiſes that, except he who knows he does not deſerve

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it; but I may add, I think, with truth, that this commander, though perhaps he has felt with as much warmth of gratitude as any man, the applauſes of his country, yet would diſclaim them upon the conditions on which ſome have tried to gain them.

The meaſures by which this general provided for the execution of his enterprize, and the defence of the colonies, though they be now controverted, were once approved: they ſtill are what they were, and it ſeems plain to reaſon they would have been approved ſtill, if any other man had followed them. He was in a command that authoriſed his taking theſe ſteps; and he was upon the ſpot to know, though we are not, that they were neceſſary. This will appear hereafter; and it is juſt it ſhould be believed now, unleſs ſome reaſonable cauſe be ſhewn to doubt it.

In the colonies, the governors whom his lordſhip aſſembled on that occaſion, entered into all his reaſons, approved all his propoſitions, and, like the government at home, adopted all his meaſures; and by their ready concurrence did him peculiar honour.

They were pleaſed to think he underſtood the ſtate of their reſpective governments better than they did themſelves; and while they acknowledged the wiſdom of placing them only on the defenſive, they were at once ſurpriſed at the eaſy means by which he propoſed to effect it; and perfectly convinced that thoſe means were ſufficient.

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When, in purſuance of his lordſhip's plan, the number of troops to be ſupplied by each colony was ſettled, and the places of their deſtination were appointed, according to the well laid and well underſtood plan of general defence; this part of the preparation was accompliſhed: and the reſpect the ſeveral governors paid to the commander, and the unanimity they ſhewed among one another, gave every poſſible proſpect of tranquillity.

Thus far the enemies of lord Loudon (but I recall the term, he can have none) let me be permitted to call them the blind and miſguided creatures of thoſe who wiſh him ill, muſt acknowledge every thing was conducted well.

The two remaining articles, the effectual conveyance of the forces, and the preſerving ſecrecy in regard to the enemy, were to be provided for, one way and only one: this was by laying an embargo on the outward-bound veſſels. Either of theſe occaſions would have juſtified that meaſure in the eye of reaſon, but both concurred to demand it. This expedient anſwered both purpoſes, and no other meaſure could have anſwered either.

I know this embargo has been an occaſion of much complaint at home, for ſome cauſe of diſſatisfaction muſt be aſſigned; and this was beſt, for it was popular. Far be it from thoſe who intereſt themſelves in lord Loudon's cauſe to endeavour to deny, to extenuate, or even to excuſe this proceeding. If there be blame laid on it,

What is the cauſe? Was it no tneceſſary to the ſervice? none would diſpute it; that would be too hardy: it would betray an ignorance no man would charge upon himſelf. Had he not a right and juſt authority to do it? there is no queſtion but he had. His orders were abſolute: he was ſuppoſed to underſtand the ſervice: he was conſidered as a brave and an honeſt man: and he will be conſidered as ſuch a one when even the deteſtation ſhall ceaſe, which will long purſue their memories who now affect to think him otherwiſe.

It muſt be owned that the laying an embargo on the outward-bound veſſels was a neceſſary meaſure, and that lord Loudon had juſt authority to do it. Of what then is it that men would complain? Is there any one will ſay a commander is to blame, who does a neceſſary action by his proper power? there is none ſo abſurd. Let them on the other hand ſay, whether they would not have blamed him if he had omitted it? They would have had juſt reaſon.

This embargo was attended with many inconveniencies to private perſons; it is allowed; but it could not be avoided. Public meaſures of the moſt uſeful kind often are ſo, and when the people's voice is left to its free courſe, the neceſſity is ſeen, and there is no complaint.

None will diſpute the neceſſity of it in this inſtance. It is impoſſible. At the ſame time it muſt be owned, it was attended with particular inconveniencies. England was in want of corn;

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at leaſt the public by bad men were made to think ſo; and to ſuffer as much as if the ſcarcity was real: there was corn in the colonies that could be ſpared; and the embargo prevented for the time its exportation. The circumſtances are certain. But did lord Loudon create theſe circumſtances? Was he the author of our imaginary famine; or in the plan of his enterprize could he forſee it?

It is allowed thoſe perſons in the colonies who had ſhipped corn for England loſt an advantage; but it was a loſs that could not be avoided: and if thoſe who have been loudeſt in complaints would make out a fair liſt of the ſufferers, the quantity ſhipped, and the time delayed, it would be found, that very little occaſions, when it is thought convenient, can raiſe great clamours. This is the fair way of ſtating the account: it is very plain why they will not be brought to do it; but if we hear more of it, 'tis not impoſſible that we may do it for them.

In plain truth the inconvenience was much leſs than has been pretended; and the importance of the meaſure greater than can be well imagined. The candid reader ſees the fair ſtate of the caſe; and he will perhaps ſay for himſelf, what, after the meaſures that have been taken, it would be indecent for me to ſay to him.

The government has, in conſequence of the clamours on this ſubject, taken from commanders, for the future, the power of extending an embargo to ſhips deſtined hither from the colonies.

I ſhall not take upon me to judge whether this ſtep be wiſe, or what were its immediate motives; for I think greatly of their integrity and wiſdom who now have power: but if it be thought by any that this new regulation reflects diſgrace upon lord Loudon, they may be told, that on the contrary, the taking away this power for the future, acknowledges he had it juſtly when he exerted it; and the neceſſity of the ſervice was really enough to have anſwered much greater private diſadvantages.

Men, whoſe own hearts had taught them to ſeek bad motives for the conduct of others, laboured to attribute this embargo to a different cauſe: and there were not wanting ſome weak enough to imagine, or wicked enough to pretend, they imagined there, that this ſtep was taken to favour the bargains of thoſe who were to provide for the forces: nor did we want here men who were impolitic enough, I had like to have ſaid abſurd enough, to adopt the opinion.

I ſhall not enlarge here upon the private character of lord Loudon; but they muſt have known very little of it, who could ſuppoſe him capable of being influenced by ſuch motives; and they muſt have ſurely ſtrange heads as well as moſt abandoned hearts, who when the nature of the publick ſervice ſo plainly and ſo needfully required this meaſure, could attribute it to private views and perſonal intereſt.

Thoſe who were upon the ſpot can acquaint the incredulous, that it was not till late in the clamour this

this accusation was started. The first complaints were of the hardships of the measure; the unhappy state of private men who must be oppressed to serve the public; and the necessities of England. These were the first expostulations; but when the lord Loudon steadily opposed the publick cause to these private hardships; and though he was concerned to see them, would not endanger the general service to remove them; then it was that private purposes were pretended; then malice taught the sufferers to invent causes, which themselves did not believe; and these were added to the former clamours.

Lord Loudon, in the consciousness of his own innocence, stemmed this torrent of calumny there; but probably he did not imagine it ever could be received in England.

If it be a crime to prefer the public service to the conveniencies of a few private persons, it cannot be denied that lord Loudon has been guilty. If the care of those forces, which are expected to perform the greatest exploits, be criminal in their commander, this nobleman is without excuse. He had, before this great affair of the embargo, incurred the ill will of some individuals on this account: and it must be owned, that he seems on that first occasion to have considered the soldiery not only as valuable members of a state, but as human creatures. These are his crimes: for he is not accused of others, except by persons who are too low for answering; and to all these I believe he will plead guilty.

Eng-

England had refuſed to give quarters to the Heſſians, whom ſhe had called over for her immediate defence, at a ſeaſon when the field preſented only death to them: and New-York, faithful to the diſgraceful example of the mother country, would have expoſed to death with as little remorſe the troops this government ſent thither for her protection, and for the enterpriſe deſigned by this commander.

On this occaſion, if reaſon be allowed to judge, lord Loudon's conduct may be ſet as a model for all future officers in the like circumſtance.

The troops the government had ſent in purſuance of the plan, arrived after the worſt hardſhips of a winter's voyage: and, after all their ſufferings, they had the ſpirit to ſay, that they complained of nothing, ſince they knew the ſervice required it.

The people, though they had been ſenſible enough of theſe dangers, and though they looked upon theſe troops as deſtined for their laſting ſecurity, yet would have treated them with a rigour diſgraceful, even if ſhewn toward the priſoners of an enemy: the public houſes were by no means ſufficient for their reception; and to the moſt mild remonſtrances, the magiſtracy anſwered, with as little decency as feeling, that they ſhould not be admitted into private ones. The commander knew equally his power, and the neceſſity of the ſervice: he ordered them in a fair and equal diſtribution to the private as well as publick houſes. The magiſtracy inſiſted on their

their rights and privileges; to which lord Loudon opposed his authority, and the necessity of the service. They were outrageous, and he was resolute. He always spoke with great respect of their natural and political rights; but he would not sacrifice to them the lives of the soldiers. His Lordship carried his point; and he then took orders for the good behaviour of the soldiers. In this he was as indefatigable, as he had been resolute in giving them quarters; and it will be owned at New-York for ever, in spite even of prejudice itself, that the soldiers behaved with so perfect regularity and decency, that those who had been loudest in the opposition, owned afterwards they suffered no hardship.

Let us now fairly review these two capital incidents. It was on these the commander first lost the good will of some people in the colonies; and these, as soon as they found encouragement from England, spread the most unjust aspersions.

Lord Loudon had the honour to be entrusted with the conduct of a very important enterprize; and he manifested a due care and a becoming spirit in providing in these two instances for the preservation of the troops, and for preventing that common source of disappointment in English enterprizes, the intelligence of the enemy. In each of these cases some private persons suffered inconveniencies: and there are mouths in which a little hardship will make a loud complaint. It is enough to say, that the disadvantages in each case were the least that could be expected; and that, with a determined care for the success of

the enterprise, all possible attention was shewn to the interest of the people. The embargo was continued no longer than the necessity of the service required: and the people suffered nothing from receiving their deliverers into their houses. Perhaps they saved all by it. The schemes and purposes of the enemy for that year's campaign are now known; and their disappointment was owing solely to these succours; so that it is not too much to say, that the numbers of these forces, and the determined spirit of the commander in chief, which the French also knew, saved these colonies without striking a blow. If they knew what it is for a country to be the seat of war, they will at length understand what are those services of a force which deters the enemy from attacking them: and they will know, what those who are fit to command armies always know, that much more service may in such cases be done by keeping the forces together, than even by the gaining a victory.

Whether or not this has been the case in that quarter of the world, let those speak who have been upon the spot at the time: others talk as they are influenced; often wickedly, and always ignorantly. It is probable, that we shall now speedily receive the news of victories and acquisitions there; but it will be allowed, that the operations of the preceeding campaign have laid the foundation of them, and led the way to them: and no man will have the presumption to say, that equal advantages would not have followed,

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if the command had continued in the ſame hands. For my own part, and I am not altogether unacquainted with the circumſtances, I think certainly they would: and when I recollect the fury of applauſe and good opinion, which accompanied this nobleman on his undertaking the ſervice; and ſee no ſtep by which he has juſtly forfeited that good opinion, or deſerved even the lighteſt cenſure, I cannot join the multitude in diſclaiming my firſt ſentiments: but rather pity the weakneſs of human nature, and bluſh to ſee men of greater abilities carried with the torrent, and adopting opinions which they could not defend.

It was an article of high importance in the regulation of this enterprize, that a fleet of conſiderable force ſhould ſail from England at ſuch a ſeaſon as to join its influence in the action. The commander in chief of the forces knew very well at what time this fleet ought to ſail from England; and when it might reaſonably be expected in America. His lordſhip computed the voyage, as accurately as ſuch circumſtances will admit of computations; for a voyage to America is always longer than one from thence to England: and allowing for this and for the chance of winds, he computed that they might be expected the firſt week in June.

Let me demand, with that fair freedom which becomes the truth, Can any man ſay lord Loudon judged amiſs in this reſpect? was it not reaſonable that he ſhould expect the fleet at that time?

or was it reasonable he should undertake without them an enterprize of so great moment, and in which they were destined to have so large a share? Plain as the answers to these questions are, the demand is not the less necessary. What I have heard objected to the conduct of this nobleman, has arisen either from want of knowledge of the most plain facts, or from a resolution to conceal that knowledge. The answer to all the cavils is so plain, a man of reason is almost ashamed to make it; but they should blush who have rendered it necessary.

Much more might be said: and may be if farther occasion calls; but, for the satisfaction of the disinterested public, this will be sufficient.

We have seen the state of the enterprize, its dependence upon a fleet from England, and the regular expectation of that reinforcement. Let us review the conduct of lord Loudon, even to the minutest article; for what is honourable will bear it, and be more itself, the stricter is the trial. It will rise as gold from the furnace, the more pure and perfect for these strict enquiries.

The troops who had arrived in the depth of winter, had been recruited and refreshed by three months rest and food in their quarters, when the preparation was to be begun for the service. These quarters and this refreshment we have shewn they owed to lord Loudon: the people would have left them in the streets to perish. The spirit and determined resolution with which, though under the lowest language, his lordship had

had insisted on this point, against the magistracy and people, doubtless have made him many enemies there; but they ought to have procured him more friends here; and to have endeared him for ever to the army.

It was plain those people would endeavour to misrepresent his actions; but their source of enmity, which continued not the less violent tho' concealed, should have been always considered here; and their accounts judged accordingly. The transports became the next consideration; and it was computed, that about ninety would be sufficient for the embarkation. Timely care was taken of this: the government was not put to a needless expence, by keeping them in pay a long while before they were wanted; nor was the preparation left to the last moment. As it was possible the fleet from England might arrive sooner than the computation, ninety vessels for this service were ready by the first week in May, and were got together at New-York, with orders to be in readiness to receive the forces. This was the conduct of the general; and let me ask those who would find fault throughout his proceedings, What in this was wrong, What was ill-judged, or What they would wish otherwise? It is thus we have desired them to examine the whole conduct of the enterprize, and thus we shall desire they will continue the examination. That these things are true as they are here represented, is notorious: and how could they have been directed better?

Lord

Lord Loudon held all things thus in readineſs a fortnight, waiting with that impatience which could not but ariſe in the breaſt of a commander who loved his country, and had concerted meaſures for rendering her the moſt important ſervice, for the arrival of the fleet from England.

Though toward the end of May they were not arrived, as every day brought the utmoſt limits of the computation nearer and nearer, the forces were, in the laſt week of that month, ordered to embark.

This was done with good order and due expedition. They arrived at Sandyhook on the firſt day of June; and the fifth of that month, the time of utmoſt computation for the arrival of the Engliſh fleet, lord Loudon alſo embarked, that he might be in readineſs to ſail on it's arrival.

Hitherto let us ask partiality itſelf, Was there any fault in the conduct of lord Loudon; or could there any be pretended in it? Is it not evident that his force was ready, and himſelf re dy, to act on the arrival o' the fleet; and would they have had him ſail without them?

While the preparations were making at New-York, for our troops embarking, news came that the French had a ſquadron of ſome force cruiſing off Hallifax: that they were ſix ſhips of war, five of them of the line; and that they were deſtined to Louisbourg. The intelligence, which came expreſs from Boſton, was confirmed by the crews of ſome prizes which had fallen into the hands of the privateers of New-York; their teſtimony relating

relating to the number and force of the ships concurring with the account from our own people.

The fleet from England, eagerly expected, was not yet arrived. What was the commander of the land-forces to do? Could he with his transports and the small support of ships of war that attended them, proceed against such a force? there is none so rash or ignorant as to say it.

All that could be done was done: two ships of war sent out to view the coast, the transports remaining at anchor.

The year was now advanced toward the latter end of June: and the season of the campaign, in which so much was to be done, became contracted into very narrow limits. Lord Loudon, who had formed the plan, and from his knowledge of all circumstances had so great expectations from it, passed the hours employed in this necessary step, in great impatience: at length these ships returned, and had seen nothing of the enemy.

The operations of the campaign, the hope of advantage to England from all this preparation, hung now almost upon a point of time, a moment.

To sail was not without hazard; but to delay longer was to give up all. If such a force of the enemy, as had been represented, should have fallen in with the transports, the event must have been dreadful; but there was hope they might not, since these ships sent out on purpose had not seen them.

Lord Loudon, urged by this prospect of success, and by the certain mischief of a longer delay

lay, failed on the twentieth of June; and he arrived in ten days at Halifax.

Perfect in the expectation of the English fleet's coming, lord Loudon, who had waited hour by hour while he lay at Sandyhook, for it's appearance, never doubted, but in the time of his failing from thence to Halifax they would arrive: but even this thought was vain. He made the dangerous voyage successfully; but he found no fleet, nor had the least notice of any.

Delays in England, and contrary winds in the passage, kept admiral Holbourn from North America till the second week in July. I do not know that there is any accusation fairly to be laid against those who were expected to prevent the delay at home; and certainly the winds are uncontroulable: but whatsoever prevented this fleet from arriving at the expected time in America, prevented also the successful execution of the project. The present fleet has sailed under more happy auspices: it has reached the destination more than two months earlier than that did which should have supported the operations of lord Loudon; and as we judge with reason that the delay of that fleet prevented our success, we may with equal justice promise ourselves that glory from the present expedition, which it was impossible to reap in the other.

Lord Loudon found at Halifax the destined reinforcement of ships and men; and he landed his soldiers, and encamped them on an advantageous ground.

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All this time the eagerly expected fleet was absent. His lordship kept the men employed in clearing ground for a parade, and afterwards in regularly exercising them upon it, and in making every other preparation that could be necessary or useful in the succeeding time of action.

At last the fleet arrived; not in a body, but ship by ship, as the winds and seas permitted. July was wasting fast; and every motion required now the most pressing haste. The first step toward the attack of Louisbourg was to learn the state of the place at that instant, the force and condition of the enemy, and the several circumstances which might give light into the best method of attack.

Vessels had from time to time been sent out to this purpose; and now some of the best sailing ones in the fleet, with the most experienced pilots on board, were dispatched with the two great instructions, a careful examination, and a quick return.

In the mean time the care lay in preparing the land forces for the attack. The number amounted to about eleven thousand; but a great part of these were new to the profession of arms, and ignorant of the duty.

The first business had been to give them the rudiments of their instruction, on their landing at Halifax; and they were now practised in the methods of attack; and accustomed to the smell of powder, by repeated representations of regular sieges; in which every incident that could occur

in actual ſervice was ſhewn them; and all thoſe things which might have thrown them into confuſion in the aſſault, by their novelty, were rendered familiar by the examples, conducted with the moſt perfect regularity in theſe exerciſes.

This was the employment of the land force, while intelligence was ſought by the ſhips: and by this the men were ſo well taught their duty, and ſo familiar with every article in the attack of an enemy, that perhaps from a body in great part raw and undiſciplined, they were, by the end of that ſhort interval, ſuch as it would be difficult to equal in many armies.

It does not appear to me, that a better uſe could have been made of the time neceſſarily employed in gaining intelligence: nor can it appear to any, that Louisbourg ſhould have been attacked before this information was obtained. There is no man ſo loſt to reaſon. Yet this is by ſome ſtrange artifice, and by a more ſtrange conduct in the generality, attributed to the commander in chief as a crime; and he is thought blameable for it. This alſo gave occaſion to the gallant impatience of an officer in high commmand; which I yet think deſerved applauſe, not cenſure; much leſs the harſh ſteps which a council of war thought proper to take upon that occaſion.

He who blames eagerneſs in the troops, condemns what he ought of all things to encourage and applaud. The earneſt valour of the officers is of the ſame true ſtamp, and of the ſame high character;

character; the regulations of the ſervice will always prevent its going too great a length, and it is a good preſage of ſucceſs in action.

Theſe are to wiſh for the engagement, but it is the commander in chief who is to determine when to enter upon it. His valour ſhould be of another caſt and character, tempered with cool thought, and under the abſolute controul of reaſon.

He alone is to determine when and in what manner to attack the enemy; his place and office give him this authority; and the firſt praiſe in thoſe who are under him in command, is acquieſcence in his opinions, with unanimity.

The repeated exerciſes and conſtant employment of the troops in theſe attacks, had raiſed in them a ſpirit of earneſt deſire to enter on the real ſervice; and it is no wonder their officers breathed the ſame generous ardour. I think it may be ſaid, within the bounds of modeſt truth, that no man in the army deſired the opportunity of entering upon action, more earneſtly than lord Loudon; but in him it was a deſire tempered with a thouſand cautions. The lives of the men, the ſucceſs of the enterprize, the glory of his country, and her immediate and moſt important intereſts, depended ſolely upon him: he muſt anſwer it to God and to his country, if all was not conducted rightly, and the leaſt overſight of his might coſt the lives of the men, and the very hope of the cauſe.

For theſe reaſons he earneſtly ſought the neceſſary intelligence; and certainly the manage-

ment and employment of the force while he waited for it (however some men, in whose minds raillery takes the place of reason, may have represented it) was the most rational that could have been devised.

The soldiers thought so; and they found the effects of it, in such an improvement as was never made in a like body of troops in equal time; the people also thought it who were on the spot. It was an act of which every man could judge; and all voices were unanimous in approving it.

If it could be charged upon lord Loudon that he protracted the time of waiting for this intelligence, and that he had omitted such means of it as were before in his power, there would be just ground for this censure: but it is notorious that was not the case. Our attempts for intelligence were unhappily delayed and disappointed; but these mischances in the execution cannot lay blame upon the commander who gave the orders. This and this only is the question with relation to his lordship; Did he or did he not dispatch vessels at proper times, and with proper instructions, on this important service? It is most evident that he did: and this was all he could do. We can no more charge upon lord Loudon the ill luck of those he sent out for this purpose, than the delay of the English fleet.

It is certain that such a fleet, the force and destination of which were settled so long before, might have arrived in North America at a much earlier period; and in that case the time necessa-

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ry for gaining intelligence would not have swallowed up the season fit for action; but it is not lord Loudon's fault the fleet from England came so much too late. He could do no more than get in readiness to act with it when it should arrive; and he was in that readiness. The time of gaining intelligence between the arrival of the fleet, and the entering upon action, must be allowed as a necessary period of delay, by all who weigh the action. This could not be retrenched by lord Loudon; the only question, which can regard his lordship's conduct, is, whether he prolonged it? Let this be examined strictly, for it will be to his advantage every article should be so scrutinized; but let us set out justly. The time was prolonged beyond all expectation; but lord Loudon no more prolonged it, than he delayed the fleet.

It is allowed, intelligence was necessary from time to time, and most essential of all before the entering upon action. Lord Loudon had from time to time sought and obtained it, and just before the engaging in the service, he dispatched swift-sailing vessels, and good pilots, to obtain it, and to make a speedy return. Some time must elapse in this employment; and during this time, his lordship exercised and accustomed the forces to the intended service. This was not censured; far otherwise; it was applauded. But the time of waiting was protracted, and when the intelligence was slow, he was censured as if he had been the cause; and the employment of the troops in mock fights and counter-

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feit attacks was condemned and ridiculed even by those who had before applauded it. So light is human nature!

If this employment of the soldiers was reasonable at first, it could not be ridiculous afterwards; if it was once right, it could not become wrong, unless by wasting useful time upon it. But the time could not be useful till the intelligence arrived; and the censure was therefore most unfair. The commander in chief ordered these exercises for the instruction and improvement of the soldiery, in a time of inaction; this inaction was necessary while the intelligence was sought, and it could not but continue till the intelligence arrived. There could be no better or more useful employment of the soldiers during that period, and it was not continued any longer.

One almost blushes to state propositions which are in themselves so clear, so largely; but there is no other way to combat the popular clamour. They who have been so rash as to censure this commander, either do not understand these things, tho' they are so plain, or they affect not to see them clearly. It is necessary therefore to state them as they are; either to convince those persons, or to shew the public that they act against conviction.

With regard to the delay itself, now let the impartial hear the reasons. The very day the commander in chief came to Halifax, the most experienced pilot of the place, captain Goram, was singled out for the important service of gain-

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ing intelligence of the enemy's ſtrength and condition. His orders were expreſs, and they implied diligent enquiry, and a quick return. He found in the harbour of Louisbourg fourteen ſhips of war; ten of the line, the others frigates: this was the condition of the enemy before the arrival of the Britiſh fleet, and I ſuppoſe the moſt ſevere accuſer of this general's conduct will allow, all that he could do was to gain intelligence of it. There is none who would have had him enter on the attack againſt this force, and without the fleet.

The time of waiting for the Engliſh ſhips was ſo conſiderable, that great alterations in the ſtate of the enemy's affairs might have been made in that period: therefore freſh knowledge of their ſtrength was afterwards neceſſary. Captain Rous was then ſent out in the Succeſs, and two veſſels of leſs force, with one of the tranſports, the beſt ſailor among them. Intelligence from this ſource was of the higheſt importance, and the deſign was excellent for obtaining it. The tranſport was to be ſent as cloſe into the mouth of the harbour as poſſible, that the French might take her for a prize, this would naturally have brought out a pilot: and they were to have come back with him to the general and commander of the fleet.

If this failed, and he ſhould be chaſed by the ſhips of war, the orders were for the ſhips in the offing to get between the enemy and land, and take up any veſſel they ſhould ſee, that the people might be examined for the neceſſary intelligence.

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The commander in chief can have no more to answer for, than this plan of service, and these orders. We know the plan was not executed, and the orders were not punctually followed; but this lies not at his door: nor indeed at any man's. There seemed a better opportunity of intelligence to offer, and the pursuit of that prevented the other. All that regards lord Loudon, is the propriety of this design for gaining it; and that, we may presume, none will attempt to blame; it is certain none there blamed it; and they were better judges than any can be here.

That the commander in chief was fully determined to attack the French, upon the state of evidence first brought in by captain Goram, none pretend to doubt; nor can it be said that any necessary or proper measure tending to that purpose was omitted. The arrival of the fleet was to give the means of the attack; and all that could be done now, was to have every thing in readiness.

After this all was conducted in the same manner: and the last day of July all the transports were ordered in divisions to the west shore, and to have the boats ready for receiving the troops; a proper number of men draughted from the Halifax regiments were sent on board the men of war; and the whole force had orders to be ready for embarking at an hour's notice. The next day all the troops were embarked, councils were held for the immediate conduct of the enterprize,

terprize, and a sloop of war was dispatched to England, with intelligence of all that had passed.

The Success, whose captain had the command of the ships sent out for intelligence a full fortnight before, thought he had fallen in with readier means than those contrived for this purpose: two vessels came in sight as he sailed toward Louisbourg, which by all marks and characters appeared to be a privateer schooner of the enemy, with a frigate of Louisbourg. The captain put himself in such position that they could not scape him; and while he pursued them, dispatched the transport back to acquaint the governor what fortune had thrown into his way.

When he came up with these vessels, his hopes of information vanished: he had the misfortune to find, that all his zeal and earnestness for the service had only served to lead him into an error. The vessels were an English privateer with a prize.

What added to this ill fortune, was, that the transport being gone, it was impossible for him to execute the first intended plan. He sought by every means to repair the mischance, and succeeded so far, as to take a fishing vessel newly come from Louisbourg, which he carried into Halifax.

The intelligence these people gave, strengthened the resolution of immediately attacking the place, and gave that spirit and eager expectation to the forces, which rise from certainty of success. They confirmed in every instance the truth of captain Goram's first account, as to the state of

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things at the time when he gave it; and they repre-ſented them in a yet fairer light for our enter-prize at preſent. The account the people ob-tained from this intelligence was, that of the four-teen ſhips of war ſeen there by captain Goram, one half were ſent to Canada; the enemy not having penetrated into the ſecret of our purpoſes, nor knowing where we deſtined the attack. The garriſon of Louiſbourg, they added, was not more than three thouſand men.

All now conſpired to animate and encourage the troops; and every meaſure was taken for the imediate execution of the great deſign: the forces were embarked, the veſſels ready, and Gaberon bay, near the harbour of Louisbourg, was appoint-ed as the rendezvous in caſe of ſeparation.

I ſuppoſe it will be allowed, that the attacking or not attacking Louisbourg muſt have been in reaſon determined by the force there: what our own ſtrength was, we perfectly know; and upon the intelligence now ſtated, there was fair reaſon to promiſe ourſelves ſucceſs. Under theſe circum-ſtances the attack was reſolved; and under theſe it would have been executed: but other intelli-gence arrived the next day but one; and neceſ-ſarily occaſioned other meaſures.

Captain Goram, ſent out a ſecond time, was not yet returned; and early on the fourth of Auguſt, a French prize was brought in: ſhe had been ſent from Louisbourg, and was bound to France; her buſineſs was to carry intelligence, and ſhe was taken, with her papers.

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Theſe gave a certain and a true account: a ſpy might be deceived; but thoſe who wrote home an account of the ſtate and ſtrength of the place, muſt know it. This was certain intelligence; the reſt was conjecture. By this it appeared; that there were then in the harbour of Louisbourg twenty-nine ſhips of war, ſeventeen of them of the line, the reſt frigates; and that the forces amounted to four thouſand regulars, beſide the garriſon of three thouſand before-mentioned.

This changed the face of affairs abſolutely, and, with it, changed the meaſures of the commander. As certain as it had been that we might attempt Louisbourg with great hopes of ſucceſs, according to the former accounts; ſo plain it was that we now could not.

The ſtrength of the enemy rendered the taking of the place impracticable; and the general has been blamed, who therefore declined the undertaking.

This is the fair, and this the true ſtate of the noble commander's conduct: and this will, with the impartial, ſet aſide all cenſure. If we may credit the accounts ſince that time, this ſtate of the place, contained in the French papers, muſt have been true; and in that caſe it would have been raſhneſs unbecoming a general, and unjuſtifiable in the higheſt degree, to have made the attempt.

It appears that lord Loudon, from this and other concurrent teſtimonies, found the place too well ſupported to be attacked with his force;

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and he therefore gave up the design for that year: leaving the glory of this important conquest to some succeeding and more favourable opportunity. He took back the forces; distributed them in advantageous stations; and was preparing for other enterprizes, when it pleased the government to give the command to another.

These are the facts relating to that undertaking: they are plain, certain, and notorious: there is nothing new to the reader in this state of them, for those who have before from time to time recorded them, have done it justly. From these the arguments are easy, and the conclusion is certain, that lord Loudon has acted according to the power entrusted to him, like a brave and wise man: and that the state of things determined him to defer that enterprize, in which there is no prospect he could have succeeded, to times in which it may perhaps be accomplished by another. Though whenever it is done, the publick will find, that even with more force, and more advantages, the struggle will be desperate.

If we would learn how ill reports first rose concerning the commander; and why a man almost adored one year, became the object of unfair censure in another, the cause is easy; and they know little of human nature who cannot trace it without our assistance. Our opinion of men and actions in that remote part of the world, cannot but be influenced greatly by the sentiments of those upon the spot; whom we suppose to have

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more opportunities of knowing, and whose testimony we are too apt to receive, without considering the influence of their passions.

The opinions of people in England concerning lord Loudon have been greatly influenced by those of the inhabitants of New York: perhaps it may be fair to say, they have been derived absolutely from them.

Those people, like ourselves, set out with a high opinion of this nobleman; and it is a point of importance to consider how they came to change it. If he would have been directed by their interested views, or would have preferred their convenience to the service of the state, he would have had their suffrages to this day. We ought, instead of adopting their unfair suggestions, to honour him for the causes of their distaste.

If lord Loudon would have left his soldiers without quarters, these people would have been satisfied: if he would have left all means open to the intelligence of the enemy, they would have made no complaints.

It is certain by the account of the people in the vessel taken by the Success, that they did not know the destination of our forces, and that great point, the division of their force, had been gained by it. This was a consequence of the embargo: and it was such as promised the most certain success to our enterprize, if the fleet from England had arrived at that time, to have joined in the execution. That fleet was delayed; and it appears by the intelligence obtained from the other

other prize, that, in the mean time, the French had encreased their seven ships to nine and twenty. That which was practicable against the smaller force, was impossible to be performed in opposition to the larger; and the attack of Louisbourg which might have been made at the first favourable time, was postponed by the delay of our fleet, to a period when it was impracticable. I accuse no person: but this accident was the cause, and this single circumstance was the reason we did not attack Louisbourg at a time when probably we might have taken it.

In the mean while, the people of our colonies, disgusted at the high-hand with which lord London had necessarily carried the affair of quartering the troops and the embargo, sought all occasions of misrepresenting his lordship's conduct: accidents in which he had no concern were in their consequences attributed to him, as if he had caused them; and every measure that falsehood, within the reach of their low cunning, could adopt, were used, to perplex and disturb his lordship's councils.

When they were tired with the novelty of the exercise of the soldiers, they began to complain that it was delaying business, and wasting useful time; though they at the same time knew the delay was the not arriving of the expected intelligence, and this was only an employment of the soldiers till it came.

They first bred those disaffections in the officers, of which they afterwards blamed the consequences;

ſequences; and they even attempted to ſet aſide the evidence of that force in Louisbourg, which rendered the attack impracticable, by a falſehood as inſolent in the contrivance, as it was eaſy of detection.

The ſtate of the place, and ſtrength of the enemy, on the knowledge of which the enterprize was ſuſpended, were given by the French officers themſelves, and intended for their ſovereign. The account, on the ſtrength of which they have endeavoured to invalidate it, was what they called the teſtimony of captain Goram. They were cunning to fix upon this name, for it had credit; and they were bold to uſe it: they had no right to his name, when they annexed it to their ſcandalous fiction.

'Tis certain captain Goram was ſent out a ſecond time, and that he returned with a ſecond account of the ſtrength of the enemy. But what that account was, they never knew or heard: they gave out in the place of it, ſuch an account as might beſt ſuit their own bad purpoſes; and they produced for this the authority of a Jew, who declared he had received it from captain Goram at midnight, or before day break, the day ſucceeding his arrival.

This ſtory was their own, and they could give it whatever circumſtances would beſt ſuit their purpoſe. They varied nothing from that ſtate of the enemy's force, which ſet it at the loweſt: the Jew declared the French had only five ſhips

of the line, and two frigates; and that captain Goram gave him that account.

In the evening of the ſeventh of Auguſt, captain Goram came in from his expedition, and the Jew affirmed, that he had come on ſhore during the night, as it ſhould ſeem to tell him this news, for there does not appear any other buſineſs that could bring him thither, and that having told him this, he returned.

Added to the improbability of this ſtory, there was proved in it abſolute falſhood. It was not likely that captain Goram, when he had been ſent on an enterprize of ſecrecy and importance, ſhould come on ſhore to tell what he had ſeen to a poor Jew, before he gave an account of it to thoſe who employed him; nor is it any more probable, that what he ſaw ſhould contradict what the French officers themſelves had juſt wrote home to their ſovereign.

Captain Goram declared the whole an utter falſity. He aſſured all who asked him, that he never came aſhore that night; nor then or at any other time had ſpoke with the Jew upon that ſubject.

This was a conviction there was no withſtanding; the ſtory was given up there, though it has been revived in England. The Jew was impriſoned as an impoſtor, but ſoon after diſcharged without puniſhment: the commander, whoſe reputation was intended to be hurt by this poor contrivance, being very much above ſuch mean reſentments. He conſidered the fellow as he was,

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the tool of a ſet of deſigning men, whom as he would not have condeſcended to puniſh in their own perſons, much leſs would he regard this miſerable inſtument of their baſeneſs. What account captain Goram really brought, can be no ſecret; if lord Loudon be ſuppoſed a perſon intereſted in the event, it may be known from admiral Holbourn.

Theſe are the proper ſources of intelligence; and it is upon theſe and no other, we ſhould found our good or bad opinion, our cenſure or applauſe of diſtinguiſhed perſons. There is great merit in the action, when men of rank and affluence expoſe themſelves to the dangers and fatigues of war for the public benefit; and we ought to look on thoſe who do it with a high reſpect. No rank or influence ſhould ſcreen the guilty from infamy or puniſhment; but it becomes the public to be very ſure of facts before they form injurious ſuſpicions. If it become a practice to indulge this diſingenuous and indecent conduct of railing without cauſe, at all who do not ſucceed, we ſhall diſguſt thoſe who are fit for high employments; and no man will undertake the ſervice, but he who ſets no value on his reputation.

F I N I S.